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unable to prepare an effective brief in opposition .... to determine the
material portions of the record to designate for printing, [sic] to assure
[themselves] of the correctness of the record while it is in the clerk's
office.... "18
As to Yeatts' assignment of error for ineffective assistance of
counsel, the court emphasizedthat the assignment of error merely stated
that the circuit court erred by dismissing the petition "'without ordering
an evidentiary hearing as to his allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel."' 19 The court determined that "[t]his assignment of error only
challenge[d] the alleged procedural failure to order an evidentiary
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 291,455 S.E.2d at 22 (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 290, 455 S.E.2d at 21.
hearing; it [did] not challenge, with reasonable certainty, the habeas
court's substantive ruling on the merits of the ineffective assistance
claims."
20
The draconian approach of the Supreme Court of Virginia is well
worth noting for counsel writing assignments of error. Yeatts had
"devote[d] a substantial portion of his brief to [the] argument" that the
circuit court had erred in finding that his trial counsel were not ineffec-
tive.2 1 As apractical matter, this would appear to identify with more than
sufficient specificity the error committed by the trial court to enable the
Commonwealth to determine the material portions of the record, to
assure itself of the correctness of the record while it was in the clerk's
office, and to prepare an effective brief in opposition. In light of this
ruling, it is critical that habeas petitioners clearly and specifically include
in their Assignments of Error section of the brief every claim which they
intend to argue.
Summary and analysis by:
Douglas S. Collica
CHANDLER v. COMMONWEALTH
249 Va. 270, 455 S.E.2d 219 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On the evening of February 7, 1993, Lance A. Chandler, along
with two of his friends, walked into a convenience store with the
intent to steal beer and money.1 The two friends walked to the back
of the store for the beer. Chandler went to the cashier, pointed a gun
at him, and demanded money. When the cashier did not immediately
respond, Chandler closed his eyes, pulled the trigger, and said,
"boom, boom." Chandler then pulled the trigger a second time and
a bullet entered the cashier's head, killing him.2 Chandler was
charged with capital murder, use of a firearm in the commission of
a capital murder, robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of a
robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery.
3
1 Chandler v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270,274,455 S.E.2d 219,
222 (1995).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 273, 455 S.E.2d at 221.
4 1d.
5 Id. at 281,455 S.E.2d 226, 227.
6 Id, at 273, 284, 455 S.E.2d at 221,228. The Court rejected some
of the defendant's assignments of error in brief, conclusive language.
Others did not involve death penalty law. On still others, the rulings
provide little, if any, guidance because they apply broad, settled prin-
ciples of law to facts that are specific to the case being reviewed. Issues
in these categories that will not be addressed in this summary include: (1)
claims that the Virginia death penalty statute is unconstitutional on
grounds that it violates the Eighth Amendment; it does not provide for
adequate consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the
term "future dangerousness" is unconstitutionally vague; it does not
require a trial judge to reduce death sentence on a showing of "good
cause;" it allows consideration of hearsay evidence during the sentencing
phase; and it does not provide formeaningful appellate review. (Chandler's
attorney should be commended, however, for raising and preserving
these constitutional claims); (2) claim that the prosecution used its
peremptory strikes to remove a disproportionate number of African-
In the first stage of the bifurcated trial, ajury convicted Chandler of
all of the charged crimes.4 At the penalty stage of the trial, Chandler
refused to allow his attorney to present mitigating evidence. The jury
then fixed Chandler's penalty at death based on future dangerousness. At
the sentencing hearing, Chandler decided to offer mitigating evidence to
the trial judge. Chandler then moved to have the jury sentence set aside,
but the trial judge denied the motion.
5
HOLDING
Under Virginia Code sections 17-110.1(A) and 17-110.1(F), the
Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the automatic review of
Chandler's death sentence with his other appeals. The court then upheld
the convictions and death sentence.
6
Americans in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); and
(3) claim that the trial judge should not have allowed a hearsay admission
against interest. Note, however, that this final claim was not federalized,
and therefore federal review of the issue is now precluded. Every hearsay
claim must also be characterized as a violation of the confrontation clause
of the Sixth Amendment. For an example of proper federalization of a
hearsay claim see Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
There was also a claim based on Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S.
Ct. 2187 (1994) (regarding admission of parole ineligibility evidence)
which was found to have been defaulted for failure to raise at the proper
time. The jury asked for the meaning of a life sentence, but the judge
refused to instruct them on parole law. No objection was made until the
post-sentencing hearing. Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
the claim was defaulted for failure to make a contemporaneous objection
under Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25.
The opinion does not reflect whether the United States Supreme
Court decision in Simmons, requiring that juries be instructed on parole
ineligibility, occurred between the trial and sentencing hearing under Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Virginia's
finding that the claim was defaulted serves no legitimate state interest.
The purpose of a contemporaneous objection rule is to give trial courts
the opportunity to make a correct ruling, eliminating the cost and
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Change of Venue
Prior to his trial, Chandler requested a change of venue based on a
claim that newspaper coverage resulted in prejudicial pre-trial publicity.
Chandler offered three articles from local newspapers as evidence to
support his motion. The motion was denied by the trial court. At trial,
potential jurors were questioned as to their knowledge of these articles.
Those jurors who had read the articles were questioned as to their ability
to give Chandler a fair trial. Two potential jurors responded that they
wouldbe unable to give afairtrial; those two individuals were dismissed.
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the trial court's decision, finding
that the record did not demonstrate unduly prejudicial pre-trial public-
ity.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has consistently required more than
a large quantity of newspaper articles to demonstrate prejudicial pre-trial
publicity. The court has required a showing of either a specific inaccu-
racy in the printed statements or widespread prejudice, regardless of the
volume of publicity coverage. 8 Therefore it is crucial that defense
attorneys offer more evidence than newspaper articles in support of a
motion for change of venue.
Defense attorneys should research the amount of prejudice. This
research can be done by using a third party to conduct random telephone
polls of eligible jurors. The third party could then testify to the results. In
addition, a questionnaire table could be set up at a local shopping center,
where people in the community could be randomly surveyed. 9 Defense
attorneys should also research the possibility of inaccuracy in all news-
paper articles. This challenge is difficult, and so is the legal standard.
However, in some cases, relief has been granted. Although some relief
is the result of the appeals process, 10 it is more frequent that circuit court
judges in Virginia will exercise their discretion to assure fairness when
substantial evidence is presented to them.
inefficiency of retrials when errors are made. Under then-existing
precedent from the Supreme Court of Virginia, the trial judge was
absolutely precluded in any event from answering the parole law ques-
tion asked by the jury. See, e.g.,Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395,
404-05,442 S.E.2d 678,685 (1994); Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va.
177, 197, 427 S.E.2d 379, 392 (1993); Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244
Va. 386, 408-09, 422 S.E.2d 380, 394-95 (1992); Eaton v. Common-
wealth, 240 Va. 236,248-49,397 S.E.2d 385, 392-393 (1990). Thus, if
the refusal was error, nothing could have been accomplished by contem-
poraneous objection.
7 Chandler, 249 Va. at 275, 455 S.E.2d at 222. (The opinion does
not reflect if the change ofvenue motion was made on grounds that denial
would violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by fair and impartial
jury and other United States Constitution provisions. All trial and
appellate issues must be raised and preserved on federal as well as state
law grounds.)
8 See, e.g.,Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386,422 S.E.2d 380
(1992); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1,419 S.E.2d 606 (1992);
George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264,411 S.E.2d 12 (1991); Mackall
v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 372 S.E.2d 759 (1988); Pope v.
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 360 S.E.2d 352 (1987); Tuggle v. Com-
monwealth, 228 Va. 493, 323 S.E.2d 352 (1984); Epperly v. Common-
wealth, 224 Va. 214,294 S.E.2d 882 (1982); Bassett v. Commonwealth,
222 Va. 844,284 S.E.2d 844 (1981); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214
I. Sentencing Hearing
Although Chandlerhad refused to offerevidence in mitigation at the
sentencing hearing, he changed his mind and offered evidence at the
post-sentence hearing conductedpursuant to Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.5.11 He testified that he had been taking medication for stress, that
he had nightmares about the victim of the murder, that he had not seen
his father for several years, and that his mother had recently died of
cancer. Chandler also offered the testimony of his pastor who stated that
he had known Chandler for many years and that he was the pastor at
Chandler's church. Chandler then moved "to set aside the jury's recom-
mended sentence to death as contrary to the law and the evidence."
12
Chandler assigned as error the failure to grant this motion. Noting that no
motion had been made at trial challenging the sufficiency of the future
dangerousness finding, the Supreme Court of Virginia viewed this
assignment as a claim that the trial judge should have set aside the jury's
sentence when he considered all the evidence, including the mitigating
evidence which the jury did not hear. The Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld the decision of the trial court to impose the jury's sentence.
13
The mitigating evidence presented to the trial judge was not
substantial. The scant evidence was no doubt due in part to the fact that
it had to be collected at the last minute because of Chandler's initial
instruction that he wanted no mitigation evidence presented. However,
this situation could have been avoided. Defense attorneys should always
investigate and prepare mitigation well before the guilt phase begins and




The court also rejected a claim that the evidence was insufficient to
establishpremeditation. 15 Early Supreme Court of Virginia cases seemed
to define premeditation as a process rather than a mental state. The
Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974); Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 214 Va.
747, 204 S.E.2d 258 (1974).
9 Please contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for assis-
tance in this matter.
10Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
11 This code section requires that, when a person's sentence has
been fixed a death, a probation officer of the court shall investigate the
history of the person and all other relevant facts. The officer is then to
prepare areport onhis findings. Finally, the court is to consider the report
and, "upon good cause shown," may set aside the death sentence and
impose life imprisonment.
12 Chandler, 249 Va. at 281, 455 S.E.2d at 227.
13 Id. at 280-82, 455 S.E.2d at 226, 227.
14 For a discussion of this ethical and professional dilemma, see
Henderson, Presenting Mitigation Against the ClieAt's Wishes:A Moral
orProfessional Imperative?, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 
3 2
(1993).
15 Chandler argued that his testimony demonstrated that he did not
intend to kill the victim. His testimony included the fact that he had
opened the gun and looked at the cylinder, seeing "'about three empty
shell casings and one that still had the slug in it."' He therefore thought
he would have to pull the trigger at least four times before there would
actually be a live round. Thus, he did not expect the gun to fire when he
pulled the trigger the second time. Chandler, 244 Va. at 280,455 S.E.2d
at 225.
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Supreme Court of Virginia has held that premeditation means that the
defendant "reflected with a view to determine whether he would kill or
not, and that he ... determined to kill, as result of that reflection." 16 In
recent years, however, the Supreme Court of Virginia has not often
commented on premeditation. Most often, the only comment by the court
is that no specific time is necessary. 17 Some recent cases even seem to
equate premeditation with intent to kill-"[t]o premeditate means to
adopt a specific intent to kill."
'18
Chandler, however, does seem to reaffirm the holdings of the early
cases. The court stated that premeditation need not exist for any specific
amount of time. 19 But the court went on to say that, in order for the jury
to decide whether Chandlerpossessed the requisite premeditation, jurors
had to "decide whether they believed Chandler's testimony that he did
not think the gun would go off until he pulled the trigger four times or
whether Chandler planned to commit murder, either prior to entering
the store with a loaded gun or as he fired twice at [the victim's] head." 20
Thus, the court seems to suggest again that premeditation is more than a
mental state. Rather, it involves the process of planning to commit
murder.
2 1
Although Chandler's claim addressed sufficiency of premeditation
evidence, the court's response suggests that, at the very least, defense
counsel should consider proffering a jury instruction in the language of
McDaniel, which is still good law.
22
IV. Statutory Review
In capital murder cases in which the sentence is fixed at death, the
defendant is entitled by Virginia Code section 17-110.1(C() to an auto-
matic review of the sentence by the Supreme Court of Virginia to
determine whether (i) the sentence was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, or (ii) the sentence is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.
In order to take a more active role in this automatic review process,
Chandler's attorney presented forty-eight cases by which the Supreme
Court of Virginia could conduct proportionality comparisons to this
case.23 These cases included eighteen in which the sentence of death had
been given based on the future dangerousness predicate, and thirty in
which death had been given based on both the vileness and the future
dangerousness predicates. Chandler then argued that his case and back-
ground formed a profile that was much less likely to be dangerous in the
16 McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 281,284 (1883).
17 See, e.g., Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222,427 S.E.2d 394
(1993); Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130,360 S.E.2d 196 (1987);
Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124,321 S.E.2d 273 (1984).
18 Smith v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 696,700,261 S.E.2d 550, 553
(1980). ("Adopt," however, may be consistent with weighing options
and deciding-i.e., a process.)
19 Chandler, 249 Va. at 280, 455 S.E.2d at 225, citing Clozza v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 134, 321 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1984).
20 Id. at 280,455 S.E.2d at 225 (emphasis added).
21 Defense attorneys should use this case, as well as the early
Supreme Court of Virginia cases, to request ajury instruction explaining
that premeditation involves more than just intending to kill; it involves
planning to kill.
22 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-263.2, which states, "A proposed jury
instruction submittedby aparty, which constitutes an accurate statement
of the law applicable to the case, shall not be withheld from thejury solely
for its nonconformance with model jury instructions."
23 This was an excellent attempt to force the court to exercise its
statutory duty and even though it was unsuccessful, it is a potentially
effective way to preserve the issue for federal review.
future than the defendants' profiles in the cases presented for compari-
son.24
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that the "proportionality
review, however, is not a comparison of the perceived degrees of
potential future dangerousness." 25 Instead, the court uses the finding of
future dangerousness to "delineatel the category of case in which a
sentence of death was imposed that we will use for comparison pur-
poses."
26
The court also stated that "mitigating circumstances generally have
been a factor in instances where similar crimes have received the lesser
penalty." 27 This statement indicates that the Supreme Court of Virginia
does not consider mitigation in its review.
Finally, the court determined that, in cases where the defendant was
sentenced to death, the factor which was "[c]ommon to each such murder
[was] a cruelty and lack of respect for human life which is independent
of the perpetrator's prior activities or other factors." 28
The problem with this part of the court's analysis is that its standard,
"cruelty and lack of respect for human life," which is supposed to
separate classes of murder, does not. All murder involves cruelty and lack
of respect for human life to some degree. Thus, it is impossible to
distinguish capital murder from murder, or capital murder for which
death is appropriate from capital murder forwhich it is not. Therefore, the
court's standard is a meaningless one.
Another problem with the court's analysis is its discussion of
proportionality review. The court explained that the test for the propor-
tionality review required by Virginia Code section 17-110.1(C) is
"'whether other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally impose
the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, considering both
the crime and the defendant." 29 However, in its application of that test
in this case, the court considered only the circumstances of the crime-
that it involved a firearm and that it was committed in the course of
robbery. The court never considered comparatively this particular defen-
dant, his mitigation evidence, or the possibility of his being dangerous in
the future, in its discussion. Thus, in rejecting the defendant's proposed
analysis, the court failed to fully consider its own test. Arguably, this
refusal was a denial ofa state created right in that the court did not follow
its own process and a denial of meaningful appellate review, and thus
violated due process.3
0
Summary and analysis by:
Jeanne-Marie S. Raymond
24 Chandler, 249 Va. at 283-4,455 S.E.2d at 227.
25 Id. at 284, 455 S.E.2d 227.
26Id.
27 Id. at 284,455 S.E.2d at 227-28.
28 Id. at 284, 455 S.E.2d at 227.
291d. at 283,455 S.E.2d at 227, quoting Jenkins v. Commonwealth,
244 va. 445, 461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.
1862 (1993) (emphasis added).
30 This issue can be preserved on two federal grounds. The first is
an Eighth Amendment claim that there must be meaningful appellate
review. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). In refusing to follow its own
review standard, the Supreme Court of Virginia has denied the defendant
meaningful appellate review. The defendant's attorney in this case did
preserve this issue. The second federal claim is that by refusing to follow
its own standard of review, the Supreme Court of Virginia has arbitrarily
administered a state created right in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause. This claim should also be preserved for federal
review. See, e.g., Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
